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                                                          NOT PRECEDENTIAL
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                           ___________

           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                   FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

                      (D.C. No. 02-cv-00020)
        District Judge:  The Honorable Gregory M. Sleet
                           ___________

                     ARGUED DECEMBER 16, 2002

        BEFORE: NYGAARD, ALITO, and McKEE, Circuit Judges.

                              
             (Filed      February 12, 2003         )
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                       OPINION OF THE COURT




     Karaha Bodas Company, LLC sought to collect on a $261 million judgment
ordered against Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara ("Pertamina")
as a result of international arbitration.  The District Court issued sixteen Writs of
Execution and Attachment and Restraining Notices.  Because of a parallel New York
proceeding involving overlapping questions about ownership of certain proceeds, the
District Court stayed its proceeding in the interests of judicial economy and to avoid
potentially inconsistent rulings.  The District Court then stayed enforcement of the
restraints until it could address the validity of the restraints on the basis of an adequate
record and with the benefit of the potentially dispositive ruling in New York on many of
the same legal and factual issues. The only issue we need decide is whether we have
appellate jurisdiction over two sets of non-final orders of the District Court temporarily
staying proceedings during the pendency of parallel proceedings in another federal district
court.  We conclude that we do not have jurisdiction and will dismiss the appeal, because
the stay orders are not final under 28 U.S.C.  1291.
     To be considered final, an order must first "dispose of all claims presented to the
district court" and, second, the order must leave "nothing further for the district court to
do." Michelson v. CitiCorp Nat’l Servs., Inc., 138 F.3d 508, 513 (3d Cir. 1998). We have
frequently iterated "the usual rule that a stay is not ordinarily a final decision for purposes
of  1291, since most stays do not put the plaintiff effectively out of court." Id. at 508
(quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10, n.11
(1983)). 
     Here, the District Court explicitly held in the May 10 order that the Stay Orders
were not final, did not resolve all of the outstanding issues, and were subject to the
District Court’s further review. The District Court did not rule on the merits of the
arguments raised in the Motion to Quash, and reserved the right to revisit the issue of
enforceability:
     This ruling, as well as the court’s April 26, 2002 Memorandum and Order,
     should not be interpreted as in any way making a determination of the
     validity, or invalidity, of the writs and notices at issue.  Consideration of
     that matter, if necessary, is deferred until another day.

The District Court is simply deferring issuing a final decision on the merits until the
conclusion of related proceedings, which could have res judicata implications.  
     There exists, however, "a narrow class of collateral orders which do not meet [the]
definition of finality, but which are nevertheless immediately appealable under  1291."
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996).  KBC argues that the
collateral order exception to the finality requirement known as the Cohen
Doctrine allows jurisdiction in the instant case. In order to qualify for this exception,
KBC must satisfy the three-pronged collateral order test. Gulfstream AeroSpace Corp. v.
Mayacamas, 485 U.S. 271, 276 (1988). We have "consistently maintained that the
collateral order doctrine must be sparingly applied, ’lest the exception swallow up the
salutary general rule.’" Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 723 F.2d 1068 (3d Cir.
1983).  
     Here, we conclude that the narrow collateral order exception is inapplicable
because disputed questions have not been "conclusively" determined. Gulfstream, 485
U.S. at 276.
     In addition, we find Appellant’s contention that the stay orders are appealable
interlocutory orders under 28 U.S.C.  1292(a)(1) to be sophistic. See Cofab, Inc. v.
Philadelphia Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 141 F.3d 105,
108 (3d Cir. 1998) ("The district court ’enjoined’ no party or proceeding but rather stayed
its own action regarding the arbitration award pending the outcome of a final NLRB
ruling.").
     In sum, the stay order is not final and we will dismiss the appeal.  
TO THE CLERK:

     Please file the foregoing opinion.


                              /s/ Richard L. Nygaard
                              _________________________________
                              Circuit Judge
                                 
